Power Reconfiguration: Beyond Ghalibaf
By Raghu Kondori. The Emergence of a New Bureaucratic-Security Order
The Internal Reconfiguration of IRGC-Linked Power in the Islamic Republic and the Emergence of a New Bureaucratic-Security Order
The possible transfer of Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf from the Speakership of Parliament to the position of First Vice President, if it occurs, is more than an individual political reshuffle. It may signal a new phase in the reconfiguration of power within the Islamic Republic, in which the influence of executive, bureaucratic, and security-linked networks is gradually increasing, while traditional balances within the legislative structure are being reshaped.
However, the central issue is not Ghalibaf himself, but the political-administrative network he represents in Parliament. Over recent years, this network has managed to build a functional coalition between pragmatic conservatives, state managers, and a group of independent legislators. This coalition is less ideological in nature and more oriented toward managing power and maintaining internal balance.
If Ghalibaf leaves Parliament, the key question becomes whether this coalition can survive or whether it will fragment. In the first scenario, efforts would be made to preserve the Speakership within the same political orbit by selecting a successor aligned with this camp, in order to prevent a shift in the existing balance. The primary objective in this case is to avoid the transfer of effective parliamentary control to more radical factions and to maintain relative cohesion in decision-making structures.
If this approach fails due to fragmented votes or internal competition, the likelihood increases of moving toward a broader coalition involving Ghalibaf’s networks, segments of independents, and parts of the traditional conservative bloc. Such an arrangement could produce a temporary new consensus within Parliament.
From this perspective, the contest over the Speakership is not merely a competition between individuals, but a redefinition of the internal architecture of power within the ruling system. This logic is not limited to Parliament and can also be observed in certain managerial reshuffles across media and executive institutions.
At a broader level, the significance of these developments lies in the potential for partial alignment between the government and Parliament within a unified political network. Such alignment could enhance crisis-management capacity and coordination in power-transition processes, contributing to the formation of a more cohesive bureaucratic–security order.
This cohesion does not imply a change in the nature of the system, but rather a transformation in the mechanisms through which power is reproduced within the same structure. From this perspective, a common analytical error is to view the Islamic Republic as a static system, whereas its four-decade trajectory demonstrates continuous adaptation through elite circulation and the reconfiguration of internal coalitions. Ultimately, the key issue is not whether Ghalibaf stays or leaves, but understanding the emerging balance of power that may shape Iran’s future trajectory.
