Hidden History

This is Also My Narration of This Country’s Hidden History

“Manoto”Interview with Parviz Sabeti By Behrouz Fatali and Bahram Bigdeli

This is Also My Narration of This Country’s Hidden History
A Look at “Manoto”Interview with Parviz Sabeti By Behrouz Fatali and Bahram Bigdeli

To save Iran from the Islamic Republic and establish the stability of its bright tomorrow, a difficult and uneven path lies ahead of us. On this perilous journey, if we do not activate our truth-seeking minds and remain unprepared to accept and learn from the realities—good or bad—that have occurred in the contemporary history of our homeland, we will not reach our destination.

In the “Parviz Sabeti” documentary, we heard the account of an Iran-centered figure who served at the heart of the country’s most secret security apparatus during the reign of the late Shah.

Here, we will review the account of a leftist political activist from those distant years, who stood in the opposition to the Pahlavi government—directly opposite the position of Parviz Sabeti.

Bahram Bigdeli was born in 1955 (1334 AP) and graduated in dentistry from the University of Tehran. He entered the University of Tehran in 1973 at the age of 18, and in 1980—just two weeks before the start of the “Cultural Revolution,” which closed universities nationwide and led to the Islamic Republic’s ideological purging of “outsider” students—he managed to obtain his degree. Completing this degree was made possible by the advice of an Armenian university professor to Bahram Bigdeli, out of the professor’s friendship with his father, Abolhassan Bigdeli, who had taught literature at Alborz High School for years prior to the 1979 (1357 AP) disaster. This professor, aware of the regime’s imminent plan to close the universities, shared it with a skeptical Bahram Bigdeli and advised him to finish and defend his doctoral thesis as soon as possible before it was too late.

The beginning of Bahram Bigdeli’s political activity was intertwined with the start of his university education. Just one month after entering the university, on the Shah’s birthday on October 26, 1973 (4 Aban 1352 AP), he staged his first anti-government demonstration along with 14 other students. On that day, they gathered on the street in front of the main entrance of the University of Tehran for two to three minutes, chanting the slogan “Until the death of this dictator, the movement continues,” and then quickly dispersed.

Bahram Bigdeli, whose early political activities leaned toward the Tudeh Party, was among the youths who began operating within the “fledgling Navid organization,” which served as the internal apparatus of the Tudeh Party. Following the 1979 disaster, and by order of Noureddin Kianouri—the then-First Secretary of the Tudeh Party—this organization remained active as the covert branch of the party, surviving until the collapse of the Tudeh Party’s network in 1983 (1362 AP).

In the years following February 1979 until the crackdown on the Tudeh Party, Bahram Bigdeli openly opposed and confronted Kianouri’s policies multiple times. In 1984, when the party’s dependence on the former Soviet Union—both logistically and from a security standpoint—as well as its absolute unreformable nature became clear to him even after the devastating experience of the 1979 disaster, he left the party. From the summer of 1988 until today, he has been working tirelessly in the “Association for the Defense of Iranian Political Prisoners – Cologne,” an organization he co-founded.

Our reference to the 1973–1980 period in Bahram Bigdeli’s life is significant because the beginning and continuation of his political activity as a leftist student and youth are deeply woven into these years and their events. In other words, he was not only a witness to the emergence and evolution of the developments that led to the volatile revolutionary atmosphere and ultimately the 1979 disaster, but he also actively played a role in shaping those developments.

In his account, Bahram Bigdeli reviews events spanning a crucial period of Iranian history as a real figure possessing an internal acuity sharpened by years of bitter and unpleasant experiences. With his unique perspective, he highlights the hidden realities and complex challenges with which Iranian society wrestled at the time.

This authentic account, while bearing a clear identity, showcases Bahram Bigdeli’s courage in accepting personal responsibility as a leftist political activist during the Shah’s era, and it is precisely for this reason that it is admirable. Perhaps if other authentic accounts of this nature had been raised courageously and at the right time, the inversion of major events like August 19, 1953 (28 Mordad), or the attribution of incidents like the deaths of Samad Behrangi and Gholamreza Takhti to SAVAK would not have been cemented as actual history—lies that destructively influenced the political climate of Iran for years.

There is no doubt that with his taboo-breaking narrative, Bahram Bigdeli will pioneer a path for other eyewitnesses from the innermost layers of the opposition movements against the Pahlavi regime. Driven by love for their homeland and the goal of saving it from the brink of collapse, they will step forward, and through their true accounts, expose the false interpretations and prevalent inverted perceptions of that era. Such enlightening narratives will not only assist our deeper understanding and perception of contemporary Iranian history but will also pave the necessary ground for achieving a bright future for our country.

Bahram Bigdeli’s Narrative

In any country, transmitting historical experiences from one generation to the next is an inevitable necessity to anchor a nation’s historical memory and avoid repeating past errors.

In the “Parviz Sabeti” documentary, we witnessed Mr. Sabeti narrating the events of the Pahlavi era and the role he played in them. The same responsibility weighs heavily on the shoulders of us, the other social actors—large and small—of that time, to critique and review the events of that era based on gathered information and experiences, and to tell our own story.

If the agony of “thinking with one’s own brain” is absent, even the most obvious truths will not be welcomed or accepted by us. It is for this reason that blind, conformist group attachments must be considered the greatest barrier preventing us from seeking the truth, understanding it, and having the courage to express it.

Let me begin with the annual meeting of Republicans that was recently held in the city of Cologne. Let us note carefully that this meeting took place under conditions where the face of the world has completely changed compared to 50 years ago:

The Soviet Union has been destroyed, the specter of communism has vanished from the world, and the countries surrounding us have each, in one way or another, slipped into instability, chaos, and abandonment. Meanwhile, our homeland—though there is no longer any trace of the clergy’s spiritual influence among our people—struggles half-dead, drowned in crisis, on the brink of collapse, trapped under the insane rule of Ummah-centric internationalists.

At the head of this meeting, we see a few familiar faces:

One of these faces is Taghi Rahmani, who seeks the rule of Islamic laws by religious modernists in a future Iran. Look closely! In Iran after the overthrow of the Islamic Republic! Someone who has said that we will strive in post-Islamic Republic Iran to win the majority vote of the people to implement our proposed Islamic laws. If it doesn’t work, we will try again until we finally succeed! Forty-five years of Islamic rule, with all its disastrous effects on our country, have passed, and he is still thinking about Islamizing society!

Another face is Mohammad Reza Nikfar, one of the leftist theorists. It is enough to see his separatist and anti-Iranian intentions on the “Radio Zamaneh” website (where he serves as editor-in-chief) in an image published mid-way through a report on this gathering. An image almost entirely covered by this slogan:

“For freedom… The Democratic Alliance of Nations in Iran”!

Therefore, his agenda is also clear!

The third face is Hassan Shariatmadari, who is also satisfied with nothing less than the “nations” of Iran!

The next face is Mehdi Fatapour. Someone who, like Taghi Rahmani, Mohammad Reza Nikfar, and Hassan Shariatmadari, still has not broken away from his past outlook.

Mehdi Fatapour’s wife, Maryam Satvat, is also seen among the participants in this meeting. She, too, still finds the past guerrilla actions of herself and her comrades sweet, and her irreconcilable enmity with the Shah and the Pahlavi government has not diminished one bit. Yet, safely and in good health, she travels to the very Iran ruled by the Islamic Republic!

By naming these few political figures, we get a measure of the entire group of participants in this meeting:

Survivors of the same breed whose anti-national and anti-homeland goals and actions created the 1979 disaster! Survivors who still remain, in various ways, within the molds of their “1979 mindset” and continue down the same path that was doomed to failure from the start.

What Was the Reason for the Prosperous Outcomes of Some Dictatorial Countries Contemporary with the Shah’s Government?

To answer this question, we must look at the dictatorships contemporary with the Pahlavi government in South America, the Philippines, Indonesia, and even Spain, and examine their opposition, comparing them to the Shah and his opposition.

First and foremost, what we find in this comparison is that the policies of the dictators of these countries and the policies of the Shah were entirely identical along two fundamental axes. Both they and the Shah:

Prevented their countries from falling into the abyss of the hell of communism.
Maintained close, friendly relations with the United States.

However, when we evaluate the services rendered by these dictators on one hand, and the Shah on the other for their countries, we see that their services are not comparable to the Shah’s at all.

One must also not lose sight of the fact that none of these countries ever faced the threat of religious reactionism, nor the threat of a neighbor with a long shared border named the Soviet Union!

The point worth reflecting upon is that after the fall of these dictatorships, the politicians in the opposition of those countries proved that they were genuinely seeking democracy. In what sense? In the sense that today, looking back, they can call their former governments dictatorships, yet take pride that they themselves were genuinely pursuing democracy from the beginning. Why? Because despite the close friendly relations their countries’ dictators had with the US, none of them pursued hostility with America after achieving democracy, and none of them engaged in vengeance or asset confiscations after accepting democracy. They did not execute officials of the former regime and managed to strive toward their country’s progress without establishing another dictatorship.

Now let us see how the forces in the Shah’s opposition handled these two concepts of progress and democracy:

Unlike the opposition in South American countries, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Spain, the Shah’s opposition fundamentally had no understanding of “progress” and the “goal of progress,” which was to reach a society on par with Western societies. On the contrary, their goal was either a society modeled on the current Islamic-communist hybrid created in Iran, or building a socialist society, mostly with the help of the Soviet Union—which itself was a backward country and technically had nothing to offer other nations. Consequently, the country the Shah’s opposition wanted would have leaned toward a backward superpower, rather than toward progress and the free world. A country that technically had to remain backward forever.
The Shah’s opposition not only lacked belief in the concepts of democracy, liberalism, and human rights, but considered them insults.

Unquestionably, if 45 years ago the governance of our country had fallen into the hands of any of the other forces in the Shah’s opposition instead of the clerics and the “national-religious” figures, given the shared characteristics they all possessed—including:

Intolerance of one another
Alienation from the concept of liberal-democracy
The establishment of dictatorship
The creation of a state-run economy
Severing ties with the free world through hostility toward “US imperialism” and the West
Friendship with the opposing pole of the free world
And their Palestine-centered, anti-Israel policy

We should not have expected a fate fundamentally different for Iran and Iranians from what actually occurred!

Comparing Iran to Its Neighboring Countries

The surroundings of our Iran are filled with entities like the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Pakistan, which were created artificially over the past 100–150 years, either by separating from Iran or separating from the Ottoman Empire. Precisely on this basis, none of them possess an ancient national history and identity. It is always the existence of a national history and identity that acts as the foundation for creating a border and a domain called a homeland. And it is within a homeland that one can first achieve economic, social, and cultural progress, and then, based on that progress and as destructive political forces are controlled, gradually attain a liberal democracy.

It is for this exact reason that for our neighboring countries—which lack a real national-historical identity, are devoid of identity, and struggle in their tribal disputes with a false and manufactured history—one cannot envision a prospect where they might one day begin deep reforms within a real national boundary, and by achieving these reforms, create the foundation of liberal democracy, form parties, and ultimately attain freedom. These countries are trapped in such chaotic, complex, and tangled conditions that their escape seems nearly impossible, and the world has left them to their own devices.

In sharp contrast to these countries stands our homeland, which precisely because of its historical, cultural, and national identity possesses the genuine possibility of returning to the track of progress. Yet, we see that these remaining elements of the ‘1979 forces,’ from Shariatmadari and Nikfar among the Republicans to tribal parties, officially and openly harbor the dream of pulling it down a path where, like these historyless and identityless countries, it becomes fragmented and trapped in the chaos of tribal governments.

The Shah’s Unparalleled Social Engineering and the Calculation Error That Occurred

Mr. Sabeti was correct in his approach to the Shah’s opposition, which comprised leftist and “national-religious” forces. The continuous chain of events from that time until today, shaped by these forces, reveals the correctness of his assessments regarding the opposition of that era in Iran.

The actions of the Shah and SAVAK, so long as they helped weaken opposing forces and gradually restore health to our country’s political atmosphere, were positive actions and should have continued. However, when the policy of the Shah and consequently SAVAK (despite all of Mr. Sabeti’s warnings) changed toward the government’s irreconcilable opponents, the ground became favorable for subversives, and the disaster that should not have happened took shape.

If the communists prolonged tyranny in their countries to the point where society was destroyed negatively, the Shah was utilizing this political autocracy positively and with proper engineering—namely, by advancing social reforms and developing the society’s infrastructure.

The Shah’s social engineering was fully deliberate, calculated, and aligned with the mission he had undertaken for the prosperity of his homeland. This engineering was so beneficial and future-shaping for our society that its positive effects still remain after 50 years. It is not without reason that returning to the track of that era has become a public demand within Iranian society.

If the Shah merely wanted to preserve his monarchy, it would have sufficed not to carry out this positive engineering. But he sought a grand and progressive Iran.

What he wanted and enacted was beyond the comprehension of the “intellectual” community of that time. They opposed the very foundation of the Shah’s actions, all of which were to Iran’s benefit—actions summarized by closeness to the free world, women’s rights, and the industrialization of Iran. They wanted the destruction of the Shah’s government.

Political limitations had to be maintained to ensure, as much as possible, that no one was drawn into political work. Because becoming politicized was under the control of a destructive force, and Mr. Sabeti had seen this correctly.

The Shah’s political development was completely progressive and benevolent, yet it opened up the space for forces that acted not toward construction in society, but against the interests of the country and the nation.

The late Shah could have realized the gradual transition of society away from these destructive forces by continuing to rein in his political opponents while modernizing the country in all social, cultural, and industrial dimensions.

An open political atmosphere should have been introduced only when the intellectual foundations of these destructive forces had weakened and their impact on society had faded, and when the government saw that a significant portion of the educated population, which was on the rise, was ready for democracy and aligned with women’s freedom and friendship with the free world.

Student Protests

Blind enmity toward the Shah and his government could be seen inside the University of Tehran itself, where I was a student. It served as the laboratory where the lethal 1979 virus was being prepared.

In the environment of the University of Tehran during the 1970s (the 1350s AP), not only was there no sign of supporters of the Shah or believers in parliamentarism, but even if we assume there were, students would label them SAVAK agents. There was not even a trace of National Front (Jebhe Melli) supporters there. In other universities, the situation was exactly the same. I say this based on the joint mountain-climbing trips we, the Tehran University kids, took with kids from National (Melli), Polytechnic, Aria-Mehr universities. Not a single person could be found who thought outside the dominant atmosphere.

In those years, the protests of us opposition students stemmed from a political motivation and movement. We considered the Shah a dictator and his government American (a US puppet). These protests were carried out symbolically on various occasions—for instance, on Student Day (December 7 / 16 Azar) or following the arrest or sometimes execution of the guerrillas (Cheriks) and Mojahedin.

These protests, which were harmless and very insular, never exceeding small groups of ten to fifteen people, would at most limit themselves to gathering in front of a bank, chanting a few slogans, breaking its windows, and fleeing quickly if carried out outside the university campus. Inside university environments, it was structured so that every now and then, under a political pretext, we would try to shut down classes. To do this, students from other universities would go to a targeted university, create a disturbance by making noise and slamming or breaking doors and windows, and then flee. This action prevented us from being identified by the campus guards.

I remember it was late 1976 or early 1977. One day we were supposed to shut down the Faculty of Pharmacy. There were no stones. They had cleared all the stones across Tehran University so we wouldn’t have rocks to throw. We went on motorcycles to the university dormitory (Kuy-e Daneshgah), brought stones back, and accomplished what we intended.

I remember another time when we were again supposed to shut down the Faculty of Pharmacy, I bought several paper fruit bags from a shop so we could pull them over our heads after cutting out eyeholes to avoid recognition. We did exactly that—went in, smashed things, broke windows, and fled. The next day, I was sitting in the faculty cafeteria when a friend who had been with us the day before tossed a copy of Kayhan newspaper in front of me and walked away. I looked and saw written at the bottom of the front page: “Yesterday, masked individuals shut down the Faculty of Pharmacy by breaking windows”!

Our protests up until early 1977 did not exceed this level and were easily controllable. Out of roughly ten thousand students at the University of Tehran, our group of opposition students did not even reach 300. Just as the total number of political opponents in 1977 was negligible compared to the rest of society, which was going about its own life. The Shah’s decision to open up the political space played a major role in paving the way for us. Right after that, we were able to draw the entire university, or a very large portion of it, behind us into all-out opposition to the Shah. By opening the political space, our hands were effectively freed. Whereas, had our small group been dealt with seriously, detained for a period, or temporarily suspended from education as a punitive measure, peace and stability in society would have been preserved.

The University Guard

Fundamentally, the handling of protesting students by the university guard force was not severe. The guard force, which was the riot control force of that time, did not carry sidearms or firearms. Apparently, only their commander carried a pistol. The rest had batons. When we attacked as a form of protest and broke doors and windows, the guard force would engage us, and in the worst-case scenario, a student’s arm or leg would get broken.

Assassinations and Bombings

What Mr. Sabeti narrates about the conditions of that time matches perfectly with what I witnessed firsthand. an all-out war was underway, manifesting in the form of assassinations and bombings by the Guerrillas and Mojahedin against the government. Among us opposition students, there was no sign of proponents of democracy or advocates for human rights! The atmosphere surging among us political students was one of enmity toward the Shah and the desire and momentum for armed struggle with the goal of overthrowing the regime—an atmosphere that smelled of blood and gunpowder.

In the university environment of those years, which was rightfully restricted, one would suddenly see a student—often someone we knew from mountain climbing—disappear. Everyone understood they had gone to a safehouse (Khane-ye Timi). In those days, it was well-known among us students that the lifespan of a guerrilla was at most six months, and they would sooner or later be killed in an armed operation, or if they survived, would kill themselves with cyanide before being captured.

There was a girl at the University of Tehran named Mahrokh Fayyal, a student at the Faculty of Literature. I used to see her in the mountaineering group. She was strongly built and wore the typical Chinese-style attire common among leftists of that era. She would occasionally participate in the students’ political debates. She disappeared for a while, and we no longer saw her. It was obvious she had gone to a safehouse. Some time passed, and one day I saw her picture on the front page of the newspaper with the news that she had been killed in a street gunfight! Just like that!

Under such circumstances, how and with what guarantee could political freedom be given to opponents who were subversives, while remaining confident that the stability and security of society would not be harmed? What truly should have been done with these sabotage-inflicting terrorist individuals and groups? Where exactly was the work of Mr. Sabeti, and SAVAK as a whole, wrong? What country, even in this free world, has ever tolerated individuals and groups who violate the laws of the land through acts of sabotage such as bank robberies, smashing, burning, bombing, and even assassinating individuals? Which of the Shah’s opponents was looking for viable political activity?

It goes without saying that parallel to these internal conditions, two external enemies of the Shah—Iraq and the Soviet Union—lay in ambush in our neighborhood, waiting for an appropriate opportunity.

Goethe Institute Poetry Nights

It was in such an atmosphere that the Shah, though very likely under pressure from Carter but with a progressive outlook, initiated political liberalization. Following this decision, and despite strong opposition from Mr. Sabeti, a large number of political prisoners were released and flooded back into society. Naturally, they found the environment favorable for their subversive intentions. From there, and specifically starting with a “cultural” gathering, the opponents’ propaganda against the Shah and his government intensified, marking the starting point of the unrest that culminated in February 1979!

This “cultural” gathering, in which I was one of the participating students, continued for 10 consecutive nights and became known as the “Goethe Institute Poetry Nights.”

It was October 1977 (Mehr 1356 AP) when news exploded like a bomb in the “intellectual” scene of that time: “The Nights of Iranian Writers and Poets”!

The organizer of these nights was the Iranian Writers’ Association (Kanoon) in cooperation with the German-Iranian Cultural Relations Society (Goethe Institute). On this basis, these nights took on the name “Goethe Poetry Nights.”

Since June 1963 (Khordad 1342 AP), this was the first time we suddenly witnessed an anti-government gathering of several thousand people, formed through the holding of the Goethe Institute nights.

I remember on one of those nights, Sa’id Soltanpour, standing to recite poetry, shouted: “They beat me in prison!” and everyone cheered and clapped. It was unbelievable that he spoke so freely against the government! Standing in front of him with a tape recorder in hand, busy recording, I saw Siavash Kasraie telling him: “Sa’id! Sa’id! Finish it!” But Soltanpour ignored Kasraie’s words and continued his fiery speech. Kasraie went and brought B-Azin. But B-Azin’s plea had no effect either, and I saw Soltanpour, indifferent to Kasraie’s warnings, kicking Kasraie from behind while continuing his anti-government remarks. Meanwhile, no one interfered with him or the other speakers.

Words like strangulation, the swamp of lawlessness, and the ruling system’s fascist perceptions filled the air, and everyone’s poems smelled of revolution and blood—the smell of destruction and ruin!

Now it was Iran and a future being determined. An Iran whose bright future depended on timely action to extinguish these initial gatherings, and whose dark future hung on hesitation in suppression and the occurrence of a sudden collapse.

A short time after the “Goethe Poetry Nights,” following a proposal by students of Aria-Mehr University of Technology, it was decided that the same event be held at that university.

Among the organizers of this event were Siavash Kasraie, M. Azarm, Sa’id Soltanpour, and B-Azin. That night, you could see a massive crowd gathered on the university campus, coming from Tehran and all corners of the country to participate.

The doors of the hall opened, and attendees began filing in. I was among those who entered. Fewer than 200–300 people had made it inside when the entry of the remaining crowd was blocked. The university management declared the reason to be the limited capacity of the hall in ensuring the participants’ safety. In protest against this measure, we staged a sit-in, announcing that we would not end it until the rest of the people were allowed inside.

I remember well that night we heard the news of student demonstrations against the Shah in America on the BBC Radio. A revolutionary madness filled the space of the hall. Although the perimeter of the hall was packed with campus guards, there was no sign of breaking up the sit-in, and this surprised all of us. The fact that the guards left us alone conveyed the feeling that the government had lost its usual authority against its opponents.

The next morning, anxious mothers and fathers who had stayed awake all night waiting for their children to return home joined the crowds gathered in front of the university to take their kids back. Despite this, no one went home. All of us sit-in participants inside the hall walked straight out to join the crowd outside, and alongside Kasraie, Soltanpour, B-Azin, and M. Azarm, who were moving at the front of the crowd, we marched toward 24 Esfand (Enghelab) Square. Our numbers exceeded a thousand. Along the way, the slogans grew sharper, and shortly after, we all began chanting subversive and anti-government slogans! That was when the guards moved in and dispersed our demonstration.

Since the immediate suppression of the clerical rebellion led by Khomeini in 1963, this was the first time society was being dragged toward chaos. The difference this time was that Khomeini had not yet entered the political arena, and it was the “leftist intellectuals” who, as the initiators of the first large demonstration, sparked the revolution.

By granting permission to hold the “cultural” nights of the Goethe Institute and Aria-Mehr University of Technology, freedom was given to us leftists who possessed the smallest shred of understanding of the concept of freedom! To us who were seeking a communist revolution! To us who wanted freedom solely to destroy the regime! That was us. The rest of the political opposition was comprised either of those seeking a monotheistic classless society, or those in Khomeini’s and the clergy’s camp who, with all their “national-religious” allies, were silently harboring dreams of a sharia-based government (Hokumat-e Mashrou’eh) with their lights turned off.

None of us saw any positive aspect in the Shah’s government, and fundamentally, our political activity was aimed at destroying the entire system and nothing else! Therefore, it was natural that by granting freedom to such destructive forces, control would slip from the government’s hands!

The assessments were completely erroneous, and subsequent consequences showed that Carter’s pressure should have been resisted, and the political space should have remained closed until society was ready for political freedoms.

The Absence of Pro-Government Political Cadres and Its Cause

As demonstrations expanded, the revolution took shape and quickly spread to that segment of society that was living its normal life. When we say normal life, we mean a life with all the typical characteristics of a developing country. Our society was progressing, and the revenue flowing from oil sales was generating wealth. Yet, at the same time, these conditions provided an ideal environment for communist and Islamist propaganda. Why? Because in a growing society, inequalities become more noticeable: those who have a lot and those who have little! Fundamentally, inequality is the result of natural progress in a society and is inevitable. There is no country in the world exempt from this principle. Inequality never disappears; it can only be controlled. In the Shah’s time, the opposition’s understanding of this principle was very weak. Fundamentally, it must be said they had no understanding of it at all.

The propaganda of the leftists and Islamists rotated precisely around these inequalities. It appeared as though all enemies of the Shah had mobilized against him. In reality, by helping the country progress and grow comprehensively, the Shah had united all enemies against himself.

The educated leftists of that time, who came from the middle classes of society, had recently attained high incomes and wealth, enjoying houses, cars, and other material benefits of life. This crowd should have remained restricted because they lacked the capacity to use their new material conditions to the benefit of society. Political illiteracy and radicalism surged among them. With political freedoms, they found the opportunity to inject into society not their illiteracy or semi-literacy, but their “anti-literacy.” The same applied to religious politicians.

If we divide society into a head and a body, and consider the head as the thinking portion of society, this head neither wanted nor could understand what vision the Shah held. This head was turned either toward the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and Albania, or toward Algeria, Palestine, and what Khomeini was preaching. What the Shah said, wanted, and was implementing found almost no supporters within the Iranian intellectual community.

SAVAK had built a strong barrier against the leftists and “national-religious” figures, who carried a lethal virus, to protect the social environment from its effects. To weaken that virus and eliminate its lethal effects required time. But by granting an open political space, the necessary time was lost and the barrier that had been created cracked. That crack grew larger and larger until the barrier broke, and the virus—which could have been eradicated gradually—spread, dragging society into a disaster that has continued for 45 years.

The 2500-Year Celebrations and the Formation of the Rastakhiz Party

The Shah’s effort to stage the 2,500-year celebrations or form the Rastakhiz Party was precisely intended to remedy this lack of organized supporters by raising awareness, exciting, and encouraging a large segment of the country’s youth who held patriotic beliefs, gathering them around his deep reforms. Unfortunately, the generation the Shah was looking for emerged from the heart of Iranian society not during his own time, but 40 years later.

At that time, although the numbers of those who loved the Shah and his government among the young and educated generation were not small, and although the level of education and number of educated individuals in this generation was rising, an opportunity had not yet been created to strengthen the patriotism of this generation and provide the training essential for nurturing and raising political cadres. For this exact reason, there was neither the necessary motivation nor the sufficient political knowledge within this generation to defend his policies against the Shah’s opponents.

The Rastakhiz Party, formed with the progressive ideas and pioneering goals of the Shah, required the fresh political force that the Shah had envisioned for it. Unfortunately, more time was needed for such a force to take shape. Fundamentally, the lack of efficiency of the two parties, “Mardom” (People’s) and “Iran Novin” (New Iran), which were formed prior to the Rastakhiz Party, also stemmed from the fact that they too were created from above by the Shah’s decree, rather than from the bottom and the heart of society. Nevertheless, the Shah’s idea was correct, because after 50 years, the exact generation he envisioned has stepped into the arena—the same young, patriotic, and aware generation that recognizes the Shah as he truly was, and understands and honors the exceptional value of his thought and services.

While it is true that when the Rastakhiz Party was formed, that elite young political generation whose presence is necessary for any governing apparatus was not yet present, dissolving that fledgling party was also a major error. This action only helped worsen the country’s political situation and sent a message to the Shah’s opponents that the ruling apparatus was facing a crisis and that they, the opponents, held the upper hand in current political equations.

Final Words

The unparalleled services of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in the history of Iran are memorable and undeniable. Future generations will recognize him as a king who, with all the love he possessed for his people and country, spared no effort on the path of progress and advancement for Iran and Iranians.

The remaining heritage of Iran is the result of policies implemented by the Shah with the support of SAVAK. Was it possible to advance major social and economic reforms in any other way, considering the influence of the clergy and the presence of the Soviet Union in our neighborhood?

The Shah’s decisions regarding evaluating political conditions and granting political freedoms to opponents, though inappropriate and unsuited to necessity, demonstrated his progressive approach and do not blemish the exceptional character of the Shah. Nonetheless, the Shah should have exercised more deliberation in granting political freedoms, and while steering the country toward wealth production, progress, welfare, and consolidating stability, he should have provided the ground for gradual public participation in proportion to the correct understanding of politics and related issues by the society’s elites.

Let us remember that democracy is for democrats. Even in advanced Western countries, democracy is for democrats, and only under this condition does it work.

The freedoms the Shah had granted to the women of Iran were something the Islamists would never forgive him for, and the Shah himself was aware of this. This major factor in the political equations of that time worked to the detriment of the Shah and his ruling system, playing a decisive role in the overthrow of the Pahlavi government.

Because the Shah interacted, befriended, and cooperated with the free world—the very world that currently stands as humanity’s best achievement and which many countries dream of matching—he was accounted a traitor by the leftist and Islamic opposition. This reality made building any bridge between the Shah and his opponents impossible. In truth, to whatever extent the Shah strove toward the growth and elevation of the country, the forces in the leftist and Islamic opposition, intentionally or unintentionally, sought the backwardness of Iran.

We all owe the construction of modern Iran to the brilliant efforts of the Shah. The light he ignited with his Iran-centered vision illuminated the path of progress and prosperity for our nation. The Shah passed away single and estranged in Egypt, but the light of his ideals remains enduring, illuminating the way toward a glorious future for Iran before our great nation.

Article translated by Raghu Kondori, from Kayhan London